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"Hydrologically we operate largely in a sphere
of ignorance, not because we lack understanding
of the laws of nature as they relate to
groundwater flow and quality, but because we
lack the practical means to assess the extent
of the resource... (we) are not able to map
fresh groundwater supplies in the same way as
we quantify surface waters... (we) have to learn
to operate within the range of uncertainties
which exist of a given data base."
anonymous member of the
Ixtapa Working Group on
International Groundwater
Allocation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Water resources in the subsoil of the earth have
not been the subject of much attention by the law as a
separate and distinct resource. This is reflected in
our description of these resources as groundwater: is it
land, terra firma, or is it water? Few would argue with
the notion that outside the artificial constraints of the
law, water and land cannot be truly thought of as
distinct, but it is the nature of the legal beast that
such distinctions are to be drawn and redrawn. The focus
of this presentation is that even in the law it may be
absurd to allocate this resource without reference to
both, and absurdities are effectively preventing rational
management of these resources.
The legal principles used to determine a
government's rights over groundwater reflect the
artificiality of the distinction. The law first
considered water to be an integral component of the land.
Control of land gave control of the waters flowing
through it and found under the soil. Thereafter a
distinct body of law developed in relation to rivers and
other surface waters. As more was learned concerning the
hydrologic cycle and the connection between surface water
resources and groundwater, legal principles governing
surface water were applied to interrelated, or tributary
groundwater.
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Today we know that groundwater allocation cannot be
adequately addressed within either of these distinct
regimes. Groundwater is a fugitive resource that mocks
political boundaries that define control over land. On
the other hand, it cannot be separated from the land and
surface waters, even in theory. The way in which an
aquifer is recharged and the quality of the water stored
in an aquifer are intimately related to how we use the
land and surface waters. These realities make it
impossible to allocate the resource among jurisdictions
in the same manner that land and river systems are
allocated. Just drawing a line or setting a quantitative
allocation will not resolve disputes. Rather, allocating
control over this resource requires an on-going
cooperative process. This can only be accomplished by
taking on the challenge, to cooperate in designing
allocation schemes that recognize and accommodate the
dual nature of groundwater resources and the needs of
governmental entities.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW

No distinct body of international law is clearly
applicable to groundwater allocation. International legal
principles pertaining to a nation's territorial
prerogative over land and water are equally relevant.
In addition to general legal principles discussed below,
there is a growing body of conventional international law

concerning groundwater contamination. Any process for
allocating jurisdiction over groundwater would have to
be consistent with that body of law. [See, generally,
0.E.C.D., LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION
(1977)].
A. Principles Applicable to Land.
1. Relationship to Groundwater: Groundwater can be
considered to be an element of the subsoil, which, in
turn, is considered part of the soil. Frownfelter "The
International Component of Texas Water Law", Vol. 18 St.
M. L. J.481, 501 (1986). [citing to M. Sahovic & W.
Bishop, "The Authority of the State: Its Range with
Respect to Persons and Places”, MANUAL OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 311, 313 (M. Sorenson, ed. 1968) and
Sepulveda, DERE= INTERNACIONAL, 171 (1983)]. Rates of
recharge and water quality are directly related to how
land is used in areas of recharge. This
interrelationship has been recognized for centuries in
Moslem countries, and it is now accepted in U.S. water
quality law through the sole source aquifer designation.
[Teclaff, isTransboundary Groundwater Pollution Control",
22 Nat. Res. J. 1065 at 1071 (1982). To the extent that
land use determines well placement, this Can also affect
the amount available to another jurisdiction. A well
field can be analogized to a dam across a river. These
principles are pertinent even where an aquifer is treated
4
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as part of a surface water resource because of the
intimate relationship between land use, groundwater
quality and quantity, and surface water quality and
quantity.
2. The Traditional View: Jurisdiction of a nation over
its territory is traditionally referred to as exclusive
and opposing the rights of all other nations. There is
no more basic component to a nation's territory than the
land resources of the nation. (Frownfelter at 501 and
authorities cited therein). This is the view expressed
by many scholars. "For many -- even if they inevitably
accept the natural unity of a given deposit of resources
-- the sovereignty of a given state over its territory
and the natural wealth it contains cannot be fragmented,
much less shared. That part of a transboundary resource,
whether solid or fluid, on its own side of the border
belongs to and is the property of that State." [Szekely,
nTransboundary Resources: A View From }lexico n , Vol 26.
Nat. Res. J. 669, 674-675 (1986)].
3.

Another View: That jurisdiction over territory is

merely prima facie exclusive is prevailing customary law.
The following doctrines may limit a state's exclusive
territorial sovereignty.[Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (1979)].
(a). The Doctrine of State Responsibility: Each State
has a duty not to allow actions in its territory that

cause injury to another State or the people of another
State. [Brownlie, °A Survey of International Customary
Lawn , INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Teclaff & Utton,
eds. 1974)]. This doctrine only applies to redress acts
of past damage or to prohibit continuing conduct which
is causing or threatens to cause substantial injury to
another state. [Tarlock, "Land Use Choice: National
Prerogative vs. International Policy" in Teclaff and
Utton, supra]. This is very similar to strict liability
in tort. The extent to which the nation has control
should not arise because that is the hallmark of
sovereignty. A national government is assumed to be in
control of actions inside its boundaries. [Corfu Channel
Case, (Merits) [1949] I.C.J.Rep. 22].
The standard of care that each nation owes to all
other nations is a very tolerant ordinary user standard
(see discussion of due diligence). The reasonableness
of the nation's justification is what is in question.
The United Nations has issued a publication compiling
state practice relevant to this principle with an
unwieldy title, "Survey of State Practice Relevant to
International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law"
(U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/15, 1984). This doctrine has been
applied in the area of natural resources law.
The Trail Smelter Arbitration was an international
6

air pollution dispute between the United States and
Canada over emissions from a smelter in Canada. The case

is most famous for interpreting the state responsibility
doctrine to require clear and convincing evidence of
actual, pecuniary injury. Scholars who have
investigated the Arbitration discount the importance of
it in setting out a broad principle of international law.
The Compromis reached to guide the arbitration removed
the issue of causation from the tribunal, and in
determining the extent of liability, the two nations
agreed to apply the law and practice followed in the
United States. [Rubin., ' ,Pollution by Analogy: The Trail
Smelter Arbitration",

50 Or. L. Rev. 259 (1971);

Tarlock, supra].
The doctrine has little value as a limit on a
nation's use of groundwater because it cannot be invoked
until quantifiable injury as occurred or is imminent. The
damage to groundwater is usually irreversible if this
standard is met. It is most valuable as a bargaining chip
if there is a great likelihood of potential injury, and
consequently potential liability.
The International Law Commission (hereinafter the
I.L.C.) has been working on a concise statement of the
state responsibility doctrine since 1978. Debates over
the meaning of "territory and control" suggest that the
doctrine is narrower than previously supposed.

[McCaffrey, "An Update of the Contributions of the
International Law Commission to International
Environmental Lawn

15 Env. L. 667, 676 (1985)]. The 1984

Draft Report acknowledges a duty on the part of nations
to provide information concerning potentially harmful
activities, and suggests a negotiation procedure to
establish mechanisms to manage to problem and to address
the issue of reparation for any actual injury.
(McCaffrey, supra at 678).
(b) The Doctrine Of Due Diligence: Where a dispute

concerns a nation's failure to act, the operative
principle is that of due diligence. It has its origins
in the domestic laws of most european nations and is
considered an integral counterpart to exclusive
territorial jurisdiction. [Island of Palmas Case
(R.I.A.A. Vol. II, p. 839)]. The duty has a somewhat

objective standard: "such diligence as, having regard to
the circumstances and...the victim, could be expected
from a civilized State." [Ago: Fourth Report on State
Responsibility, U.N. doc. (A/CN/4/264)]. A nation is

expected to possess and maintain a legal and
•
administrative infrastructure necessary to fulfill its
obligations to other nations, and a nation is expected
to use this infrastructure with a degree of vigilance
adapted to the circumstances. Developing nations argue
that the doctrine should be qualified so as to take into
8
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consideration the legal and administrative structure that
a nation can afford to maintain.

[Dupuy, "Due Diligence in the International Law of
Liability" in 0.E.C.D., supra].
(c) The Duty To Cooperate: The Draft Report of the I. L.
C. suggests that the duty to cooperate is part of the
doctrine of state responsibility. It has been recognized
in the past as a distinct limit on governmental action.
Nations have a duty to cooperate when necessary to serve
the mutual interests of their respective peoples.
Scholars argue over whether this duty exists outside the
framework of an existing agreement between two nations
[Compare Camponera, "Patterns of Cooperation in
International Water Law: Principles and Institutions",
23 Nat. Res. J. 563 (1985) to Caldwell, "Concepts in
Development of International Environmental Policies" in

Teclaff and Utton, at p. 13.) and Teclaff & Teclaff
"Transboundary toxic Pollution and the Drainage Basin
Concept" 25 Nat. Res. J. 589 (1985)].
Recent developments at the United Nations may tip
the scales in favor of an independent duty in the context
of shared borders. In 1979 the General Assembly of the
United Nations adopted Resolution 34/99 on the
development and strengthening of good neighborliness
between States. [U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/367; See also General

r

Assembly Resolution 38/126 of December, 1983 (U.N. Doc.

A/RES/38/659 (1983)]. No formal statement of the
principle has been announced, but it is based upon a preexisting duty to cooperate. At least some nations seek
to expand it to economic cooperation at the border zone
on the basis of equality of rights, equity and mutual
benefit

in

the

exploitation

of

"common

resources".[Szekely, supra]. "Common Resources" are
defined as those which constitute a physical unity, and
should be subject to common exploration and exploitation
when common actions prove to serve the mutual interests
of the parties.
This duty is expressly recognized in various
conventions and other agreements concerning res communis,
resources that cannot be claimed by any one nation [See
Caldwell, supra). Even where a resource cannot be
considered res communis, a duty to cooperate can arise
from the past conduct of two nations. If two nations
have cooperated in the past by giving notice and
consulting with each other where actions may affect the
other, this duty can be found to exist. (Caponera, supra
and authorities cited therein.)
(d) Equity: It is universally accepted that rigorous
application of positive law can lead to unjust results.
Numerous statements have been made on the place of equity
in international law [ L.E.F. Goldie, ' , Equity and the
International Management of Transboundary Resources'', 25
10

Nat. Res. J. 665 (1985); Caponera, supra]. Where there

is some

positive law to apply, equity acts to prevent

unjust results. Where no positive law exists, equity can
go outside the constraints of customary law to bring
about just results. In the second instance, consent of
the parties to a dispute is required. (Goldie, supra.)
The problem is deciding what is meant by equity.
Goldie defines it "as the compendium of concepts
supporting, promoting, and implementing those
entitlements, benefits and satisfactions which are
validated by society's contemporary sense of justice and
fairness" [at 673]. It encompasses principles involving
abuse of rights, unjust enrichment, reliance, conscience,
reciprocity, the fulfillment of expectations and
obligation and communication [at 674]. Another writer
points out that there are so many components to the
principle that it is of little use on the operational
level. With the reliance principle, Williams points out
that "it is a nice judgment as to what is the
'legitimate' expectation." The notion of equal treatment
of equals sounds nice, too, but equal in what respect?
[Williams, ' , Legal, Administrative and Economic Tools for
Conflict Resolution'', STRATEGIES FOR RIVER BASIN
MANAGEMENT, 201, 202 (Lundqvist, Lohm & Falkenmark, eds.
1985)].
4. Contemporary Statements: The modern view sets up a
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tension between a nation's responsibility to other
nations and each nation's duty to exercise authority over
its natural wealth in its self interest. This tension
is reflected in the U.N. Declaration on the Human
Environment, particularly Principles 21 and 22. It is
also evident in Article 2 of the United Nation's Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States; the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Both Covenants contain the following
language: All peoples may, for their own ends, freely
dispose of their natural wealth and resources without
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international
economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual
benefit and international law. In no case may a people
be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
5. Conclusions in relation to sovereign authority over
land: The enduring hallmark of sovereignty is authority

over territory and people. It is unrealistic and
unnecessary to suggest that nations should willingly
yield this power to some supra-national agency.
[Tarlock, supra; Rodgers & Utton, "The Ixtapa Draft
Agreement Relating to Transboundary, Groundwater'', 25 Nat.
Res. J. 713 (1985)]. It is incumbent on nations to adhere
to the general principles of international law, however.
These principles suggest that in allocating groundwater
12

resources, whether presently used by a nation or not,
mechanisms allowing for bi-lateral cooperation in
regulating land uses are necessary, not merely to avoid
injury to other nations, but, due to the nature of
groundwater, to effectively allocate control of the use
of the resource among governments.
B. PERTINENT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
1.

Introduction: Where surface water resources are at

issue, international law is more developed. Although
surface water is considered a part of territory,
international law has moved away from strict notions of
territorial sovereignty. The general principles have
been refined through international practice (conventional
law) and this has led to statements of recommended rules
for determining a nation's right to water resources that
traverse its boundaries. The International Law
Association (hereinafter the I.L.A.) created the Helsinki
Rules in 1966, and the I. L. C. has considered numerous
draft reports in an effort to create a draft convention
on non-navigational uses of such waters. The definitions
of the waters of concern includes some groundwater
resources in both statements.
2. Historical Development: (a) A Shared Resource: With

the notable exception of the Harmon Doctrine (see below)
western legal theory has always treated surface water
resources as more or less shared resources.
13
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principle can be found in the writings of Grotius [2
Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, ch. 2, sec. 12 (1646)]
Victoria [De India et De Jure Belli Relectiones, Sec. 2,
titles 6 & 7,(1557)] Locke [Second Treatise on
Government, Chapt. 5] and Hobbes [Leviathan, Part Two,
Chpt. 24].
The duty to cooperate lead to early agreements among
nations over navigation. The Central Commission on the
Navigation of the Rhine was first discussed in 1785 and
created in 1831. It is still in existence today, and as
to matters of navigation it has expremely broad powers,
including the enforcement of regulations. [Brown, "The
Conventional Law of the Environment" Teclaff & Utton,
supra; Kiss, "The Protection of the Rhine Against
Pollution" 25 Nat. Res. J. 613 (1985)]. The Danube has
been the subject of joint activity since 1856. Until
1948 the Danube Commission included non-riparian states.
After World War II a new commission was formed consisting
of only the riparian nations. (Caponera, supra).
Caponera describes the expansion of the Danube
Commission's powers beyond regulation of only navigation.
(b) The Rejection of the Concept of a Shared Resource,
Upstream and Downstream: At the turn of the century,
the United States enunciated a concept based upon the
principle of absolute sovereignty in a dispute with
Mexico over the Rio Grande. Attorney General Harmon
14

declared that an upstrean nation owes no duty to
downstream riparian nations and can claim the full flow
of an international river. [21 Op. Att'y. Gen. 274,
(1895). Harmon reached this conclusion based upon
statements of Chief Justice John Marshall on the doctrine
of sovereign immunity from suit in the courts of another
nation in The Schooner Exchange V. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116 (1812)]. It is questionable whether the
Harmon doctrine was ever a correct statement of
international law, and it is not considered to be a valid
statement at this time. [Frownfelter at 502, nt.113].
The doctrine still rears its head in modern disputes over
water resources. Within the recent past, India took this
position in disputes with Pakistan over the Indus and
with Bangladesh over the Ganges. [ Kril (Advocate-General
Punjab), I.L.A. Comm. 1st Rpt. (1956); Bains, ',The
Diversion of International Rivers, ,, 1 Indian J. Int'l.
Law 39 (1960); Crow, ' , The Making and the Breaking of
Agreement on the Ganges', 255 in Lundqvist, et al. supra].

The opposite position from the Harmon Doctrine is
that a lower riparian may demand the full flow of a river
from an upstream riparian in an unaltered state as to
quantity and quality. Pakistan took this position in the
dispute with India over the Indus. (Bains, supra). It
was also the position of Spain in its dispute with France
15

that culminated in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration [At faire
du Lac Lanoux, Sentence du Tribunal Arbitraal (1957)].
An agreement between France and Spain required the
consent of the downstream nation for the upstream nation
to alter the river. The existence of the agreement did
not preclude France from going forward because the
Tribunal found that prior consent could only be required
under international law where there is clear and
convincing evidence of actual or imminent injury to the
downstream state.
2. The Modern Approach: With the rejection of the
absolutist doctrines, two theories have emerged to
address shared resources, a theory of limited territorial
sovereignty and the community theory. The difference
between the two is that limited territorial sovereignty
emphasizes cooperative regulation by co-riparians and the
community theory contemplates a giving-up of authority
to a supranational entity, with nations jointly managing,
developing, and sharing the benefits of international
water resources. The theory of limited territorial
sovereignty is considered to be prevailing customary law.
[Griffin, "The Use of Waters of International Drainage
Basins Under Customary International Law,“ 53 Am. J.
Int'l. L. 50 (1959); Teclaff, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY
AND LAW (1967); Collard, ' , Legal Aspects of Transfrontier
Pollution of Fresh Water", 0.E.C.D., supra ]•
16

Both of these theories can be criticized as
inadequate to resolve allocation issues because the
theories are resource specific, dealing only with water,
and anthropocentric, only in relation to painfully
obvious human needs. [Teclaff, supra.] In general, most
international law is subject to the same criticism
because it is the product of western culture and thought.
Although there is ample precedent outside western
philosophy for recognizing the interdependency of all
life forms, it is slowly being considered in
international law, and only as "environmental" as opposed
to "allocational" concerns. (Caldwell, supra). (a) The
Community Theory: Proponents of the community theory
argue that sovereign prerogative leads to inefficiencies
that preclude optimal use of a water resource with
minimal injury [Utton, ',InternationalWaterQualityLawn,
Teclaff & Utton, supra.]. The community theory has not
been employed to comprehensively regulate a truly
international water resource. It has been employed to
regulate specific aspects of water use such as navigation
and hydroelectric power production.
Much of the impetus behind this can be attributed
to analogies to federated nations and colonial
situations. These situations are not analogous to a
truly international situation in one crucial respect.
In federated nations and colonial situations there is a
17

superior entity with authority over the entire resource,
and policy can be set unilaterally as the superior
authority sees fit. In the absence of unilateral policy,
there is a great likelihood that the governmental
entities have congruous, or symmetrical systems of
allocating power.

Many of the hard issues of

territoriality are blunted by the superior law. If
nothing else, the superior law disposes of some
procedural issues. [ See, Bernier INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM, 249-63 (1973). This point is
illustrated by Mageed's description of cooperative
activity on the Nile during and after the colonial
period. Mageed, "The Integrated River Basin Development;
The Challenges to the Nile Basin Countries" in Lundqvist,
et al., supra at 151.] Some proponents of the community
theory acknowledge it is unworkable in the face of
political realities. [Utton, supra; but compare with
Teclaff & Teclaff, supra].
(b) Limited Territorial Sovereignty: Tbebasic:theory:
A State may make use of the waters flowing through its
territory in so far as it does not interfere with their
reasonable use by co-riparians. It has been refined to
reflect a "benefits" approach by Griffin: A riparian has
the sovereign right to make maximum use of international
waters within its borders, limited by the corresponding
right of each co-riparian. Each riparian is entitled to
18

share in the use and benefits of a system of
international waters on a just and reasonable basis.
(Griffin, supra.) This has been described as the
equitable utilization theory, not unlike the U.S. theory
of equitable apportionment. Indeed, many commentators
who have attempted to define the substance of the
doctrine have relied on U.S. precedents interpreting the
doctrine of equitable apportionment. [Lipper, ',Equitable
Utilization" THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS,
15 (Garretson, Hayton & Olmstead, eds. 1967); Utton,
uSporhase, El Paso, and the Unilateral Allocation of
Water Resources: Some Reflections on International and
Interstate Groundwater Lawn , 57 U.Colo. L. Rev. 549
(1986)].
The I. L. A.'s Helsinki Rules attempt to give
substance to the doctrine of equitable utilization: each
state in an drainage basin is entitled to a reasonable
share of the beneficial uses of the waters of the basin.
The following factors should be taken into consideration
in determining a nation's equitable share:
- the geography of the basin, including the
extent of the drainage area in the basin;
- the hydrology of the basin, including, in
particular, the contribution of water by each
basin State;
- the climate affecting the basin;
19

- past utilization, including, in particular,
existing utilization;
- the economic and social needs of each basin
State;
- the population dependent on the waters of the
basin in each basin State;
- the comparative costs of alternative means
of satisfying the social and economic needs of
each basin State;
- the availability of other resources;
- the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the use of
waters;
- the practicability of compensation as a means of
adjusting conflicts among users;
- the degree to which the needs of a State may be
satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a
co-basin State.
The major criticisms of the Helsinki Rules have to do
with (1) identification of the drainage basin as the area
of concern, (2) preference to protect past and present
use at the expense of another nation's future use, and
(3) the suggestion that monetary compensation is an
adequate means of allocating water resources. F o r
some nations, there is too much emphasis on land areas
within the drainage basin concept. (Szekely, supra). The
drainage basin concept is also criticized because it does
20

not take into consideration interbasin transfers and the
fact that surface and groundwater sources do not always
coincide. [Cano, ', Legal and Administrative Tools for
River Basin Development' , in Lundqvist, et al., supra at

189].
The I. L. C. began to work on a statement of the
law of non-navigational uses of international waters in
1974. In 1980, the Commission adopted six general
articles. The waters of concern were described as an
international watercourse system, a shared resource.
Rather than define waters by a geographical perspective,
the system perspective ignores geography, looking only
at inputs and outputs of the system. The concept of
relativity limits the extent to which a specific input
or output is part of the system. Uses are only a
component of the system if there is an effect on uses
located in another state. Any allocation is to be
determined by the principle of equitable utilization.
(McCaffrey, supra).
Subsequent drafts expanding upon the general
principles have been produced, but as of this date no
final set has been adopted by the commission. In the
1984 Report of the Special Rapporteur, the international
watercourse system was eliminated. The proposed
replacement language is "international watercourse". The
term "shared natural resource" was also eliminated from
21

the 1984 draft. The theory of equitable participation
which had appeared in the 1983 draft report was also
removed. For a discussion of this theory see, Hayton,
"The Law of International Water Resource Systems", RIVER

BASIN DEVELOPMENT, 209 (Zaman, ed. 1983). This theory
attempted to set forth the right of each riparian to
participate in the use of the water resource and the duty
to participate in the protection and conservation of the
system.
C.

APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO

GROUNDWATER
1. Defining the Resource of Concern:

Numerous

definitions of what would constitute an international
groundwater resource have been proposed by writers.
Caponera and Alheritiere define it in terms of use
(groundwater resources which, in view of their physical
characteristics, cannot be utilized unilaterally in an
unrestricted way) or state policy (water resources of
common interest to two or more states in terms of an
hydrological management unit). [Caponera & Alheritiere,
"Principles for International Groundwater Law n 18 Nat.

Res. J. 589 (1978). Given the physical uncertainties
inherent is predicting the timing and effect of one
groundwater use on other uses, other suggest that a
policy approach that recognizes the unity of land and
water use and which includes a mechanism for mutual
22

technical support is a more workable approach. [Rodgers
& utton, supra].
2.

Suggested Principles for Allocation:

In

international practice, groundwater is rarely mentioned
unless it is tributary to a surface water resource. [ A
list of agreements relating, at least indirectly, to
groundwater can be found in Rodgers & Utton, supra; See,
also, Teclaff and Utton, INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW
(1981). Many documents only consider groundwater in
relation to contamination of surface water. Utton
suggests that the following principles should be followed
in allocating groundwater: (1) the use of waters normally
should be shared; (2) no one party should be able to
determine its share of the aquifer unilaterally, whether
based upon superior geographic position, economic
position or political assertiveness; (3) each state's
share should be determined by mutual agreement or by
judicial decision based upon equitable principles; and
(4) stability of expectations should be assured so as to
provide a secure climate for the long-term management and
preservation of the resource [Utton, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev.
at 550].
Although these principles were designed to be
applied in interstate situations, with the exception of
the fourth element, the same principles may be pertinent
to international groundwater allocation.
23

At the

international level, the principle of reliance is not
universally accepted, especially where one nation has
developed at a different pace. Reliance is hard to
justify in that situation. Rather, it allows for a de
facto unilateral allocation without any consideration of
the equality of right as among nations.
I would consider another principle to be imperative:
nations must agree to exercise their respective authority
over land use and their peoples in a manner that will
prevent adverse effects on the groundwater resource. If
not, there is no certainty that a groundwater resource
will remain usable by anyone. A groundwater resource
cannot be separated from the land anymore than a
groundwater resource can be separated from an
interrelated surface water resource. This is supported
by the doctrines of state responsibility, due diligence
and the duty to cooperate.
3. Allocation as a Process Rather than a Quantification:
In respect to allocating groundwater, the notable
achievements of the Helsinki Rules and the Draft Articles
of the I.L.C.are still inadequate. Neither addresses the
great uncertainties that exist as to how to determine the
physical characteristics of an aquifer. Groundwater
supplies cannot be mapped in the same manner as surface
water resources. Any allocation will require a great
amount of technical expertise, perhaps through the use
24

of technical advisory commissions.
The experience of the United States and the Republic

of Mexico supports this proposition. The International
Boundary and Water Commission is such a bi-lateral
technical body. It recommended limits on groundwater
pumping levels from a shared aquifer as an interim
measure which was subsequently adopted by both nations
to be effective until a comprehensive agreement is
reached in relation to groundwater. [Minute 242 to the
1944 United States-Mexico Treaty Relating to the

Utilization of Waters, 12 Int'l Legal Materials 1105
(1973)]. Even if a comprehensive agreement is entered
into, the concept of interim measures, rather than a set
allocation, may be necessary due to the level of
scientific uncertainty.
4. Reconsidering the General Principles: Finally, the
concept of actual or imminent injury which triggers any
duty under customary international law must be rethought.
Groundwater use or contamination that will adversely
impact on another nation's uses may not be apparent for
many years, but the impact will be usually irreversible.
When all of the principles discussed above are combined
into one system of law, the mandate for preventative
action is apparent. If a nation is responsible for the
acts that take place on its territory, must not it
exercise its authority over people and territory so as
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to prevent eventual actual injury? Where eventual actual
injury can only be prevented

through cooperative efforts,

are not nations obligated to cooperate? The allocation
of groundwater cannot be achieved through easy solutions,
but in the absence of cooperation, there cannot be any
true allocation.
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III. INTERSTATE ALLOCATION
A. INTRODUCTION: The United States' Constitution is

the framework for allocating power between the federal
government and a state and among the states. With some
extremely important exceptions, a state government has
authority to regulate land and water in the state as an
exercise of its police powers. There are three "de jure"
means of allocating authority among states (1) unilateral
federal action, (2) the creation of compacts by states,
sometimes requiring the approval of Congress, and (3)
judicial decision by the United States' Supreme Court.
All three of these mechanisms have been used in the
context of land and water resources, sometimes as to the
same resource (See presentations on Colorado River).
In addition to the "de jure" means of allocating
jurisdiction, in the area of water resources it is not
unusual to find "de facto" allocations that are
subsequently transformed into "de jure" allocations
because the equitable principle of reliance is quite
strong in american law. [See, Colorado v. New Mexico
(II), 467 U.S. 310 (1984); Hundley, WATER AND THE WEST:
THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE POLITICS OF WATER IN
THE AMERICAN WEST (1975); Ingram, PATTERNS OF POLITICS
IN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF NEW
MEXICO'S ROLE IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN BILL (1970)].

The first two "de jure" mechanisms concentrate on
27

interpretation of federal legislation or a compact in
light of the constitutional framework. By virtue of the
supremacy clause and the necessary and proper clause,
pertinent provisions that limit how and what a state can
regulate are broadly interpreted. These included, but are
not limited to the interstate commerce clause and the
property clause. The political or civil rights of
individuals found in the document serve to limit both
state and federal action. The rights of indian tribes
which are derived from the political rights of tribal
members and protected by federal obligation also limit
both state and federal actions. Tribal authority will
be addressed separately in Section III.
B.

THE NATURE OF STATE JURISDICTION OVER NATURAL

RESOURCES - TWO VIEWS
1. The Public Trust Doctrine as a Source of Proprietary
Rights: (a) Federal Law: During the Nineteenth Century,
a state was considered to be the owner of natural
resources located within a state. The state was also
perceived to be the trustee for the collective rights of
its citizens to the resources within the states. As to
such resources, the state was both proprietor and
regulator Geer V. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896);
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230, at 237 (1907).

This view fell out of favor shortly after the decision
in Geer, supra. [See, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
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U.S. 553 (1923) and below].
There have been several recent attempts by states
to reassert proprietary-type rights to natural resources
based upon the Public Trust Doctrine. This has been
soundly rejected by the United States' Supreme Court in
relation to both land and water resources. [See,
Sporhase v, Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)(no proprietary
right to groundwater based upon state constitutional
provision that resource owned by the state for the people
of the state; Summa Corporation v. California ex rel
State Lands Commission 466 U.S. 198, (1984) (no

proprietary right in state to coastal area based upon
public trust doctrine under Spanish and Mexican Law].
(b) State Law: State Court decisions have vacillated
on this. [Compare United Plainsmen Assn v. North Dakota
State Water Conservation Comm o n 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D.
1976)(Public trust doctrine creates an affirmative state
duty to regulate for common good) to In re Adjudication
of the Big Horn 753 P.2d.76 (1988) (state has proprietary
interest in the groundwater underlying the state); See
also National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d
709 (Cal.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 413 (1983)].
2. The Public Trust Doctrine as the Source of a
Heightened Regulatory Interest: Cases decided at the same

time as Geer and Tennessee Copper acknowledged the state
to be the "guardian of the public welfare" [Hudson County
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Water Co. V. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908). The classic
statement of this theory can be found in the writings of
Pound: " [T]he so-called ownership of [natural resources]
is only a sort of guardianship for social purposes. It
is imperium, not dominium. ...Our modern way of putting
it is only an incident of the nineteenth century dogma
that everything must be owned." [R. Pound, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 199 (1922)]. This

view has been consistently applied by the U.S. Supreme
Court since 1923. Pound's theory was expressly adopted
in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). Geer V.
Connecticut was expressly overruled in 1979 [Hughes v.
Oklahoma 441 U.S. 322 (1979)]. Sporhase, supra,
acknowledges that the state, as trustee for the public,
has a heightened regulatory interest; the concept
recognizes the importance of a resource to the welfare
of the inhabitants of a state. [458 U.S. at 954].
3. State Proprietary Rights Outside the Context of the
Public Trust Doctrine: (a) A State can create
proprietary rights in natural resources by acquiring
property in the same manner that private individuals do
under applicable law. This is referred to as the "market
participant" rule. [ Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. 426
U.S. 794 (1976) and Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)]
(b) When a state acts as a proprietor, it cannot act as
a regulator. It can not use its position in the market
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as a means of regulatory subterfuge. The line between
valid market participation and action which constitutes
regulatory subterfuge is very blurred. [South Central
Timber v. WUnnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984); Cory V.
Western Oil & Gas Assoc., 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir.)
affirmed without opinion 105 S.Ct. 2349 (1985).] Some
argue that the distinction is artificial and serves no
purpose [Varat, State ' ,Citizenship, ' and Interstate
Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487 (1981). The
regulatory/proprietary test has been rejected in other
areas of the law. [as to the area of inter-governmental
tax immunities see discussion in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth. 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985)]
(c) A state is not free from most constitutional
restraints when it acts as a proprietor. The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article 4, Sec. 2, limit any state action, not just state
regulatory action. United Building & Construction Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984). The
fact that a state has spent its own revenues to create
a benefit is only one factor to be taken into
consideration in determining the legitimacy of a
challenged state action [Id.].
C. THE ALLOCATION OF POWER OVER NATURAL RESOURCES
1. Limits Inherent in the Constitutional Scheme
(a) The Tenth Amendment: The federal government's powers
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are enumerated in the Constitution. The powers of
states, often referred to as the states' police powers,
are acknowledged in the Tenth Amendment, a catch-all
provision. All powers " not delegated to the United
States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the
states or to the people."
(b) Effect of the Tenth Amendment: Throughout the last
200 years the U.S. Supreme Court has vacillated on the
effect of the Tenth Amendment. The Court now takes the
view that the guarantees that states will be free to
function in the federal system are to be found within
the power of states as recognized in the composition of
Congress as set out in the Constitution, particularly
Article 1, §3 and Article V. [San Antonio Metropolitan
Authority, supra]. If the Senate adopts a measure, the
states have consented to it. Essentially, the Tenth
Amendment protects everything within a state's competence
to act that is not contrary to federal law. Examples of
federal legislation that expressly recognizes state
authority to act include the Clean Water Act, (33 U.S.C.
§§1251, 1253) and the Natural Gas Act (15 U.S.C. §717(b).
2. Some Limits Based upon Enumerated Federal Powers
(a) The Property Clause: The Property Clause of the
Constitution gives Congress both regulatory and
proprietary authority over federal property. Kleppe V.
New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). In particular instances
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Congress can consent to state regulatory authority over
certain federal property to the extent that to do so
would be consistent with other "clear congressional
directives. [California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645
(1978); Andrus V. Charlestone Stone Products Co., Inc.,
436 U.S. 604 (1978); See also, Seattle Master Builders
Association V. Pacific Northwest Electric and
Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir.
1986) cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 939 (1987)]. This is the
flip-side of the San Antonio case. The test to determine
whether state law is applicable to federal property is
whether federal law evidences a clear and unambiguous
intent for state law to control [786 F.2d 1364].
The reserved rights doctrine determines the
characteristics of the federal property interest in water
resources shared with a state. Cappaert V. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). Where land is held only as
public domain there is no reserved federal water right
because Congress has acquiesced to state control of some
aspects of water on the public domain in the Desert Lands
Act. [California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
cement, 295 U.S. 142 (1935)]. When Congress acts to
change the nature of its interest in the land, however,
a water right is created. Sierra Club v. Block, 615 F.
Supp. 44

(D.C. Colo. 1985). When Congress acts, it

reserves or appropriates sufficient water to fulfill the
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primary purposes of the change in the land's status.
Id.; United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).

Even on the public domain the federal government does
regulate access to water by regulating access to and use
of the land itself. United States v. Allen, 578 F.2d 236
(9th Cir. 1978).
(b) The Commerce Clause: Article I, §8, cl. 3 gives
Congress the power "to regulate commerce...among the
several states". This power, even when unexercised,
limits state regulation of any resource that can be
reduced to possession by individuals. Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, supra; Sporhase, supra. If Congress has
not acted, or has acted in only general terms, the clause
prohibits state regulation that discriminates against or
unduly burdens the free flow of commerce among the
states. [Sporhase, supra (in the absence of
Congressional action); and Northwest Central Pipeline
Corporation V. State Corporation Comm i n of Kansas, 57
U.S.L.W. 4302 (March 7, 1989)(where congress has acted
in a general manner]. If state regulation expressly
discriminates against interstate commerce it is "per se
invalid" Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
Where there is no express discrimination, and a state
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, a state can still violate the commerce
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clause if it "unduly burdens interstate commerce in
relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v, Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Where there is a
general recognition of a state's authority or where the
state has a heightened regulatory interest, the
challenger must show actual undue burdens and not merely
the potential for such burdens. Northwest Central
Pipeline Corporation, supra. When Congress has acted,
the state authority is compared to the federal
legislation to determine if Congress intended to allow
a state to impede commerce in the specific manner being
challenged. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1948).
With water resources, specifically groundwater, the
heightened regulatory interest inherent in the public
trust is taken into consideration when analyzing state
actions under the commerce clause. Sporhase, supra. A
state can prefer in-state uses to a limited extent, to
conserve the resource and protect the public welfare.
This has been interpreted by lower federal courts to
allow states to prefer primarily non-economic in-state
uses over out-of-state uses. City of El Paso v. Reynolds
(II), 597 F. Supp. 694 (1984).
The commerce clause does not have force when the
state is only acting as a proprietor. If Congress has
acted, the state is regulated just as any other
proprietor.
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D.

SUMMARY AS TO THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF THE AUTHORITY

OF STATES: All of these concepts come into play when

allocating power over resources. In the remaining
portion of this section, each of the "de jure" methods
will be discussed. "De jure" allocations do not get
around any of the limitations set out above, unless
specifically provided for in the federal legislation or
the compact.
E.

ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BY CONGRESS

Pursuant to its powers in the Constitution, the
Federal Government can act to allocate resources among
the states. The Boulder Canyon Project Act is an example
of this in the context of water resources. [43 U.S.C.
§§617 et. seq.; See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
564-565 (1963). If the language is sufficiently specific,
legislation may recognize exclusive rights in a state or
group of states over certain waters. This does not
immunize the legislated allocation from claims based upon
important federal interests that are was not addressed
in the legislation. [In Arizona v. California, the
Supreme Court found that the legislatively mandated
allocation between the states of the lower Colorado River
Basin did not set aside waters for these Indian
Reservations that share the river with the states. This
did not prevent the Court from setting aside waters for
these tribes out of the waters allocated to the state in
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which a tribe's reservation was located, 373 U.S. at 595
et seq.] Furthermore, congress can alter the legislated
allocation directly or indirectly at anytime by enacting
new legislation. Where Congress has given the Secretary
of Interior the authority to allocate through contracts
for reservoir water, he can reallocate when the contracts
are renegotiated to the extent allowed under the federal
legislation. [373 U.S. at 580].
F. ALLOCATIONS THROUGH COMPACTS
1. What is a compact? States can enter into compacts
to allocate jurisdiction among themselves as to a variety
of subjects. The Constitution requires a compact to be
approved by Congress if it tends to increase the
political power in the states, which may encroach or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981) The relevant
inquiry is the extent that the compact impacts on the
federal structure. United States Steel Corporation v.
Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 454 (1978).
Interstate compacts concerning water resources will
almost always require congressional approval because of
the great likelihood that some federal interest is
involved.
(a) Because a compact is created by the states, the only
authority that it can allocate is state authority. West
Virginia ex rd l Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1981). Where
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Congress approves a compact, it has attributes of both
state action and federal action. It cannot be
characterized as one or the other exclusively. Lake
Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
440 U.S. 391 (1979). [Plaintiff can state a claim under
§1983 against compact commissioners (state action element
met)]. According to the Supreme Court in Texas v. New
Mexico (1982), congressional consent to a compact
transforms it into federal law and as a result, no court
can order any form of relief that would be inconsistent
with the terms of the compact, unless the compact is
unconstitutional. This should not be considered a broad
general statement of the law because he issue before the
Court was only procedural in nature; there was no
important federal interest at stake. Federal consent is,
if nothing else, acquiescence to the allocation of
authority in the compact, for the time being. Federal
consent does make compact interpretation a matter of
federal law, thereby insuring uniform interpretation by
federal courts. Cuyler V. Adams, supra.
In short, a compact can address situations that are
not truly national in scope, but involve some national
interest. It's purpose in the constitutional scheme is
to provide a mechanism whereby a solution to a problem
is fashioned by those most affected by the outcome.
Federal approval can be seen as acquiescence of the
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majority to a regional solution to a regional problem in
the interest of self-governance. [see, generally, Texas
v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1982); Goble, "The Compact
Clause and Transboundary Problems", 17 Envtl L. 785
(1987); Frankfurter & Landis, "The Compact Clause of the
Constitution - A Study in Interstate Adjustments" 34 Yale
L.J. 685 (1925)].
(b) Even if no substantive interpretation is given to
the compacts clause, there is the argument that Congress
acquiesces when it approves compacts. However, as with
a unilateral federal action, in the absence of clear and
unequivocal and language showing an intent to affect a
specific federal interest, a compact will not be an
affirmative barrier to Courts in recognizing and
providing for that interest. Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1963).
2. Activities Amenable to Treatment Under Compacts:
States enter into compacts in a number of areas including
taxation, banking, land-use planning and water
allocation. Whether a compact specifically allocates
groundwater may depend on the language used in allocating
land or water resources. [A comprehensive treatment of
interstate water compacts can be found in Muys,
Interstate Water Compacts (1971)]. In many compacts the
drainage basin concept is used, thereby expressly
incorporating tributary groundwater. (Pecos Compact,
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Upper Colorado River Basin Compact). Even where only the
surface flows are allocated, Courts have found tributary
groundwater to be included within the allocation. (El
Paso V. Reynolds (1)563 F.Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1982);
Rifkind, Report of the Special Waster, Arizona v.
Colorado (1960) (as to the equitable apportionment of the
Gila between Arizona and New Mexico))
In many cases the specificity of a compact may not
be an issue, particularly where there is a challenge to
in-state or region preferences in the compact based upon
the commerce clause. For example, the Upper Colorado
River Basin Compact provides that each state has the
exclusive beneficial consumptive use of a portion of
water in perpetuity. The Klamath River Compact prohibits
transportation of water outside the upper Klamath River
Basin. The Snake River Compact, the Yellowstone River
Compact and the Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact
condition out-of-basin use of the water on the approval
of the signatory states or the compact commissions. The
express language of the Yellowstone River Compact has
been upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the
face of a challenge on commerce clause grounds. Intake
Water Co. V. Yellowstone Compact Comm o n. 726 F.2d 568
(9th Cir. 1985). Such decisions however, do not
indicate what would happen in the case of a compact that
is vague or makes no reference to the potential place of
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use of the water.
G. ALLOCATION BY THE COURT

1.

Equitable Apportionment Actions: States can bring

a dispute with another state to the United States Supreme
Court.

[U.S.

Const.

Art.

III,

§2;

28

U.S.C.

§1251(a)(1982)]. When the dispute concerns water or
analogous resources, such as andromous fish, the Court
applies the doctrine of equitable apportionment. Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Idaho ex rel. Evans v.
Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983). Given the fluid nature of
groundwater the Court would likely apply this doctrine
to disputes over groundwater.
Unlike international law, the fact that a resource
is within a state does not give a state an inchoate right
to the use of it. Colorado v. New Mexico (I) 459 U.S.176
(1982); Evans v. Oregon, supra. Any right to a water
resource as between states is dependent on use.
2.

Prerequisites: The Court will not apportion a

resource just because a state requests it to do so.
Until recently, the general rule was that the complaining
state had to show an actual controversy over existing
uses. Kansas v. Colorado, supra; Arizona v. California,
supra. [In Rpt of the Special Master, Arizona v.
California, the Special Master declined to apportion the

Little Colorado between New Mexico and Arizona because
he found the existing supply was ample to meet then
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existing needs; no controversy existed]. The only
exception to this rule was where one state clearly showed
an imminent need for future domestic water supplies.
Connecticut V. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); New
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931).

One reason for this requirement is the doctrine of
judicial restraint. In Hinderlider V. LaPlata River
&Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) the Court

acknowledged that it much preferred these disputes being
addressed through the political process. [See, also
Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943)]. The fact that
the political process exists, and that an action before
the Supreme Court is available to resolve these disputes,
are two cogent reasons why equitable apportionment
decisions of the United States are not clearly analogous
to international situations. [Tarlock, supra].
3. Benefits v. Harms: When the Court decides to
exercise its jurisdiction, it still may decline to grant
the relief requested if it finds that the benefits that
would result would not clearly exceed the harms to the
status quo. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936);
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). At this point
in the analysis the Court will look to see if one state
could make better use of the water, in other words,
whether the state is living up to its duty owed to other
states to take reasonable steps to conserve and even
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augment the natural resources within its borders. Evans

V. Oregon, supra at 1017. In some instances this has led
the Court to find that granting equitable relief will not
cause substantial injury to the responding state or that
the complaining state cannot show actual injury to its
uses. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
4. Future Uses, Future Injury? The Supreme Court found

that proposed future uses could be the basis for an
equitable apportionment in Colorado v. New Mexico (I) 459
U.S. 176 (1982). [See, Note, "IS THERE A FUTURE FOR
PROPOSED WATER USES IN EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT SUITS'',

25 Nat. Res. J. 791 (1985)].
(a) Altered Burden of Proof: A state would have to show
by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of its
proposed use substantially outweighed the injury to
existing uses in the other state. Colorado v. New Mexico
(II). This reasons given for stringent burden of proof

are (1) the state proposing a future diversion should
bear most of the risks of an erroneous decision potential benefits are speculative, but harm to actual
uses is not; (2) the unique interests involved in water
rights disputes between sovereigns; and (3) society's
interest in preserving the stability of property rights
and in allocating resources to the most efficient uses
Id. In the end Colorado failed to meet its burden of
proof because it did not establish the existence of a
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commitment to any long term use for the water that would
allow for predictions of the future benefits. With
groundwater aquifers the balancing will have to be
between future uses in both states, for the purpose of
preserving existing uses. This does not fit into the
Court's calculus.
(b) The role of efficiency: An issue that was left
unanswered is whether the economic efficiency of a use
in one state should be compared to the economic
efficiency of a proposed use in another state. The two
opinions do suggest that this will be a pertinent factor
in comparing harms and benefits in the future . Justice
O'Connor, expressed the view that this inquiry should be
irrelevant under the principle of the state equality.
[See, also, Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 469].
However, if two states come into the Court with equally
specific plans for equally compelling needs, economic
efficiency could be the deciding factor.
5. Reasons Not to Apportion: There are other reasons
why the Court will decline to equitably apportion a
resource. These include whether a practical remedy can
be fashioned [Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974)],
and the ethical or moral position of the parties. These
last two are comparable to the equitable doctrines of
unclean hands and laches. If one state does not assert
its rights, but allows another to go forward with
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development of the resource, it can be found to have
acquiesced in the other state's use. Kansas v. Colorado,
320 U.S. 383 (1943). Similarly, where two states were
allowing actions which abused a river, the Court has
declined to grant any relief Missouri v. Illinois 200
U.S. 496 (1906).
6.

Factors Pertinent to Determining Relief to be

Granted: In fashioning equitable relief, the Court will
consider almost any factor that can be argued to be
relevant except past injury. Evans v. Oregon, supra.
There is no one set formula, almost a totality of the
circumstances test. When two states apply the same legal
theory to determine property interests in the resource,
that law is also pertinent. This brings up another
problem when trying to place groundwater within the
construct. With surface water, most western states apply
some version of the prior appropriation doctrine. On the
other hand, groundwater rights are determined by four
competing regimes: the rule of capture, reasonable use,
correlative rights and prior appropriation. This legal
assymetry maybe very difficult to address under existing
methods of equitable apportionment.
7.

Flexibility: Unlike international law where

equitable utilization or apportionment usually results
in a permanent right to a set quantity of water, the
"linchpin" of interstate equitable apportionment is
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flexibility. The parties can always return to Court for
a revised allocation based upon changes circumstances.
Colorado v. New Mexico (II).
8. Can this Theory be Applied to Groundwater? There
are serious questions as to how effective a traditional
equitable apportionment decree would be in relation to
groundwater. In the west, it is rarely a truly renewable
supply, even where associated with a surface stream [City
of Albuquerque v. Reynolds,71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73
(1962). Any use, over time, by one state does more that
merely create a reliance interest. It also limits the
extent of any future use of the resource by another
state. If pumping levels are great in one state, some
uses in the other state will be foreclosed. A state
cannot seek to enjoin pumping in one state so that it
could make up for past injury. The existing "de facto"
allocation is the baseline. Furthermore, as pointed out
in the section on international law, unless the decree
also provides a mechanism for cooperative land use
decisions, it is not effectively apportioning the
resource. There is little precedent for this in the
equitable apportionment decrees of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
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IV. TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER GROUNDWATER RESOURCES
A. INTRODUCTION: As with any other resource, it can be
said that tribal authority over groundwater has two
distinct sources: (a) tribal rights based upon ownership
of the resource, and (b) each tribe's retained inherent
powers of self-government. Tribes have expressly
exercised this authority with the creation of tribal
water codes and other land and water management programs.
In exercising its plenary power over tribes, Congress has
addressed this topic in the context of special
legislation to settle specific tribal water rights claims
and in the federal laws pertaining to the environment.
The Supreme Court has yet to expressly address the issue
of tribal authority over groundwater. Lower federal
courts and state courts, with one notable exception, have
generally recognized this authority, particularly in the
context land and aquifers tributary to surface water
streams.
The primary question concerning tribal rights over
groundwater is whether regulatory jurisdiction can extend
beyond the tribe's property and its members.
Federal environmental laws extend tribal jurisdiction to
all lands and people within the boundaries of the
reservation. On the other hand, Court decisions
addressing tribal civil authority are not consistent.
Some courts limit authority over non-indians and fee
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lands within the reservation to two instances: (1) where
non-indians enter into a consensual relationship with a
tribe or its members, through commercial transactions or
arrangements; and (2) where non-indian conduct threatens
or has some direct effect of the political integrity, the
economic security or the health and welfare of the tribe.
The result is a jurisdictional quagmire that can defeat
any rational resource use planning by either state or
tribal governments.
B. TRIBAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GROUNDWATER RESOURCES
1. Retained Right: In United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.

371 (1905) the Supreme Court held that unless a tribe
specifically surrenders ownership of particular resources
associated with its land, the tribe retains ownership and
may exploit the resource, subject to limitations imposed
by Congress. Tribal rights to groundwater have been
expressly addressed in actions to quantify tribal rights
where the groundwater is tributary to a surface water
stream, and the rules applicable to surface waters have
been applied.
2.

Location of the Resource: The extent of tribal

property rights in groundwater may depend on where the
resource is located. Where located wholly within the
reservation, the entire resource can be considered to be
tribal property. [Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 454 U.S. 1092
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(1981)]. Another view is that it can be considered to
be tribal property only if needed to satisfy a tribe's
reserved water right (see below). [United States v.
Alexander, 131 F.2d 359 (9th dr. 1942)].
3. Extent of Right: Where a water resource is shared
with other jurisdictions, the tribe's property interest
in the resource is determined the federal reserved right
doctrine. When the federal government reserves lands for
a tribe, rights to sufficient water for the purposes of
the reservation are also reserved. Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The purpose of an Indian
reservation is to preserve a tribe's territorial base as
part of its retained rights of self-government. The
standard most often used to quantify the scope of this
right in the practicably irrigable acreage (PIA) standard
developed in Arizona V. California, supra.
(a) The PIA standard is that amount of water necessary
to irrigate the practicably irrigable acreage within a
reservation. It is a perpetual right to a set quantity
of water per year, thereby recognizing the permanent
status of indian reservations [See, United States v.
Ahtanum Irrigation District, 236 F.2d 321, 326 (9th dir.
1956)]. In formulating this standard, Special Master
Rifkind determined that this was the most objective means
to measure a tribal right. He took into consideration
that lack of economic resources and inconsistent federal
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action had precluded development of water resources on
tribal lands. He also took into consideration the other
negative effects of former federal policies.[Rifkind
Report (1960)].

As late as 1983, practicable meant feasible, in
other words, if possible. The most limiting factor was
the nature of the soils; was the land such that if water
were applied, plants could be grown. Arizona v,
California (1963). In a supplemental proceeding to the
original Arizona v. California action to determine tribal

water rights to additional lands, the new Special Master,
Tuttle, applied a costs/benefits analysis to measure the
efficiency of a water use in determining the quantity of
the tribal rights to water. The Supreme Court did not
reach the issue of the applicability of this analysis to
tribal rights before it remanded the action to the
Special Master, but it characterized the PIA standard as
a soils test. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
At this writing the U.S. Supreme Court is considering a
decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court that has
interpreted practicable to mean economically efficient.
In re Adjudication of the Big Korn River, supra. In

fact, a higher efficiency standard was applied to
determine whether certain lands are practicably irrigable
than is applied to determine the feasibility of nontribal water projects.
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In United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978)
reserved rights for a solely federal use was defined by
the primary purposes of the reservation. When courts
have attempted to extend this requirement to tribal
rights, normally the courts will not recognize uses for
other than agricultural and domestic uses. [Shrago,
"Emerging Indian Water Rights: An Analysis of Recent
Judicial Legislative Developments", 26 Rocky Mtn. Min.
L. Inst. 1105; In re Adjudication of the Big Horn,
supra.] Do we still believe Indians must be farmers?
The Supreme Court has rejected this ethnocentric concept
in the past, Arizona v. California 439 U.S. 419, 422
(1979). Application of the primary purposes requirement
to tribal water rights has been the subject of great
criticism. [Mayerson & Goodman, ' , Indian Water Rights:
Old Promises, New Opportunities'', Paper No. 7, P.7-8
(Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1989); Burton, ' ,The American
Indian Water Rights Dilemma: Historical Perspective and
Dispute-Settling Policy Recommendations", 7 Jour. Envtl.
L. 1 (1987)]. (b) For tribes whose lands are suited for
agricultural use topographically, a reserved right
quantified under the PIA standard is fairly generous
because agricultural uses require large amounts of water.
The standard is not fair or generous to those tribes
whose lands are not receptive to agricultural uses. Most
courts have been unwilling to fashion some other
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standard, but precedent does exist for going outside the
strict PIA standard. In the Washington Fishing Cases the
reserved rights doctrine was applied to andromous fish.
The court found that the amount reserved for tribal uses
was that amount necessary to provide a reasonable
livelihood for present and future tribal members. In
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) the Supreme
Court noted, in passing, that the reasonable livelihood
standard was consistent with the 1963 decision in Arizona
v. California.
(c) The federal reserved rights doctrine has been applied
to groundwater that is hydrologically related to surface
water in Cappaert v. United States, supra. Lower federal
and state courts have expressly recognized tribal
reserved rights to this type of groundwater in most
instances where the issue has been raised. Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir) cert
denied 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F.
Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985). [Per conversation with
H. Becker, Assistant U.S. Attorney in Albuquerque, New
Mexico, tribal rights to groundwater have been recognized
in all on-going state and federal court adjudications in
New Mexico.] These Courts have recognized the necessity
of tribal control over hydrologically related groundwater
so that the entire resource can be managed in an
efficient, conjunctive manner. Reynolds V. Aamodt, supra;
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Colville, supra.
The one notable exception is the Big Horn

Adjudication. The North Dakota Supreme Court denied the
existence of any tribal right to groundwater on the basis
of state ownership. This ruling effectively precludes
conjunctive management of the surface and ground water
resources, and the relationship to land uses. Conjunctive
management by the tribe is problematic, and may not be
politically feasible.
The validity of this holding is highly specious for
many reasons. The state does not have authority over
tribal land, and under U.S. Supreme Court precedent in
the area of equitable apportionment and the commerce
clause, a state's right to water is based only upon use.
Furthermore, this state ownership was based on the public
trust doctrine which does not give rise to a proprietary
right in the state. Sporhase, supra. Second, when
acting in its capacity as trustee for the public, the
state is acting as parens patriae for all its citizens.
Tribal members are state citizens as well as tribal
citizens. A state cannot act in this capacity to
establish rights for the benefit of one group of citizens
as against another group of citizens. Reynolds v. Aamodt
537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976).
(d) One open question is whether tribes have property
rights in groundwater resources that are not
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hydrologically related to surface water systems. If
treated as an incident of ownership of overlying land,
then the existence of tribal property rights would depend
on whether the tribe held the overlying lands.
If an aquifer was under tribal lands and lands of another
jurisdiction it is likely that in an adjudication of the
aquifer some form of the reserved rights doctrine would
be applied.
In some situations aquifers that are not related to
an existing surface stream are the only water available.
Congress has recognized that in this situation a reserved
right existed at one time to the waters, but in each
instance the water had been already taken for primarily
non-indian uses off the reservation. Recognizing the
unfulfilled reserved right was the basis for establishing
a violation of the trust responsibility that had to be
redressed through costly "rescue" legislation. [See
Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. 97293, 96 Stat. 1274; Act of July 28, 1978 Concerning the
Water Rights of the fl-Chin Reservation, Pub. L. No. 95328, 92 Stat. 409]. These reserved rights are then met
through substitute water supplies, such as the Central
Arizona Project. How many more projects can this nation
afford? These acts are evidence of the fact that just
setting out a quantity allocation does not, without more,
allocate groundwater resources.
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Some writers suggest that the nature of these
resources argues in favor of treating them in the same
manner as mineral interests. [Mayerson & Goodman, supra
at 7-10]. There is some sense to this suggestion. In
water law, groundwater resources can be characterized as
flow or stock resources. Rodgers & Utton, supra at 749754. These types of aquifers are considered to be stock
resources and as such, it is not unusual to for them to
be "mined": the amount extracted from the aquifer is
greater than the recharge to the aquifer. In that case,
the resource cannot represent a permanent water source,
it is nonrenewable. These resources can be used as
emergency supplies in times of drought, or can be used
for relatively short-term development; they cannot be the
basis for maintenance of a permanent economic base.
[This limitation is expressly addressed in Mathers V.
Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966)(the Court
upheld state regulation of a non-tributary aquifer that
contemplated a useful aquifer life of 40 years) and in
Fundingsland v. Colorado Groundwater Commission, 171
Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835 (1970)(the Court upheld state
regulation that contemplated a useful aquifer life of 25
years)]. Another consideration is that these water
resources generally require the investment of relatively
large amounts of capital to bring the water to the
surface, much less distribute it to where it can be used,
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and these costs increase as more waters are
extracted. [See, Burke, Cummings & Muys, "Interstate
Allocation and Management of Non-tributary
Groundwater u (1984)(Paper prepared for Western Governor's
Association); and Bagley, ',Water Rights Law and Public
Policies relating to Groundwater 'Mining ,

in the

Southwestern States", 4 J.L. and Econ. 144(1961)]. When
these characteristics of groundwater are considered, it
can be argued that although a tribe can be the owner of
such resources by virtue of land ownership, these
resources should not be considered in quantifying a
tribe's reserved rights. The federal policy of tribal
self-determination includes the development of permanent,
diverse reservation economies. To force a tribe to rely
on these types of resources to fully use their reserved
water rights would, in many cases be equivalent to a
denial of the right in economic terms. Furthermore, even
if the necessary capital was available, these water
resources are not self-renewing, as in the case of
surface water. They cannot be thought of as a permanent
water supply for any longterm development or maintenance
of a reservation economy.
C. TRIBAL REGULATION OF GROUNDWATER
1. Federal Reservation Public Welfare: "The concept of

public welfare is broad and inclusive. (citation
omitted). The values it represents are spiritual as well
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as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within
the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well balanced as well as
carefully patrolled. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33
(1954). Although states rely on the broad language of
this case as a description of state police powers, the
U.S. Supreme Court was defining the police powers of a
federal reservation in that case. The District of
Columbia is the quintessential federal reservation, and
in 1954 there was no legislature elected by the residents
of the city.
(a) Tribal Retained Inherent Power: For indian tribes,
what we call the police power is an integral part of a
tribe's inherent powers that were retained when a tribe
entered into relations with the United States. This
power extends, at a minimum, to tribal members and/or
tribal territory. Merrion V. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130 (1982); U.S. V. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975);
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
(b) Tribes have affirmatively exercised this power over
uses of their lands and waters from time immemorial. For
some tribes this power is exercised as part of a tribe's
unwritten traditions that are integral to the social and
religious practices of the tribe.
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[Ortiz, The Tewa

World]. Some tribes have enacted written land and water
codes that are similar to those adopted by states. The
Navajo Tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation and the Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation are just a few of the tribes that
have adopted tribal water codes. These codes assert
jurisdiction over all uses of water within reservation
boundaries, and all users, regardless of tribal
membership. The Colville Code allows the state primary
jurisdiction on lands owned by non-members pursuant to
a cooperative agreement with the state of Washington.
This agreement contemplates joint management and control
of the water resources in a manner that is consistent
with both state and tribal laws. [For an excellent
discussion of present tribal water planning and
regulation see Shupe, "Water In Indian Country: From
Paper Rights to a Managed Resource" 57 U.Colo. L. Rev.
561 (1986)).
(c) This inherent authority has been recognized by the
federal government not only in treaties, but in federal
environmental laws where tribal jurisdiction is expressly
recognized as extending to the boundaries of the
reservation. [In particular, see §1377(e) of the Clean
Water Act: "The Administrator is authorized to treat an
Indian tribe as a state... (2) the functions to be
exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management
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and protection of water resources which are held by an
Indian tribe, held by the united states in trust for
Indians...or otherwise within the borders of an Indian
reservation." For a general discussion of the pertinent
provisions of federal environmental regulation see Walker
&Gover, "Tribal Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction to Enforce
Environmental Laws", Mineral Development on Indian Lands,
Paper No. 14 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn 1989)].
3. LIMITS ON TRIBAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY: Challenges
to tribal regulation come about in two different
circumstances. First, a nonmember who owns property in
fee located inside reservation boundaries may challenge
a tribe's regulation. In these cases there is no
explicit issue of state regulation, merely whether the
tribe can regulate the individual's activities. In the
second instance, another jurisdiction, usually a state
entity, may attempt to exercise its regulatory authority
over such lands within a reservation. In Montana v.
United States these two situations were blurred. The
tribe's jurisdiction was limited because the Court held
that the United States never recognized a tribal right
to the land, it was not on the reservation. Therefore
the tribe could not regulate the activities of nonmembers there. In both circumstances courts apply an
interests analysis to determine the extent of tribal
jurisdiction. In the first instance a court looks to
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determine if the exercise of tribal authority over the
individual comports with notions of due process through
a modified minimum contacts analysis as set forth in
Montana v. United States, supra. When a state is
asserting jurisdiction a court employs an analysis
similar to that used to determine the validity of state
regulation of interstate commerce, or federal property:
(1) Does federal law preempt the assertion of state
authority; and if not, (2) does the assertion of state
authority unlawfully infringe on the right of Indians to
make their own rules and be governed by them. Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Under the first step the
federal interest is defined. Under the second step,
state and tribal interests are defined and all three are
considered.
The analysis can not look to merely the
governmental interests of a state and those of the
federal government. A third governmental interest, that
of the tribe's is taken into consideration by virtue of
the definition of the federal interest: the federal
trust responsibility to protect tribal rights of selfgovernment. This is the "backdrop of tribal sovereignty"
that must be taken into consideration. (cite).
For example, in the absence of any federal
preemptive action, a state cannot merely rely on the
heightened regulatory authority over water resources
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based on the public trust doctrine to triumph over tribal
authority because the tribe has the same heightened
regulatory interest. In such a situation, it would
appear that the federal interest in protecting tribal
authority would be the determinative factor that would
require a court to uphold the authority of the tribe
under a preemption theory.
4. The Montana Decision: In Montana the Supreme Court
set out two situations where tribal regulations may be
applied to those who are not members of the tribe: (1)
when a person or entity enters into a consensual
relationship with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealings, contracts, leases or other
arrangements, or (2) when a person or entity engages in
conduct that threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security or the health
or welfare of the tribe. 450 U.S. at 565. In Montana,
after determining that the situs was not on the
reservation, the Supreme Court essentially found that the
state had authority to regulate in that instance because
the tribe had not alleged any detrimental effect from
non-indian conduct on tribal political integrity,
economic security or health and welfare.
5.

Tribal Land Use Regulation: Decisions concerning

tribal land use regulation have generally upheld tribal
authority to regulate the land uses of non-members based
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upon the second situation set forth in Montana. See,
Knight v. Shoshone and Arapaho Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d
900 (10th Cir. 1982). Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside 828 F.2d 529 (9th
Cir. 1987) cert granted 56 U.S.LW. 3864 (June 20,1988).
In Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665
F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 977
(1982) the tribe's right to regulate a non-member
landowner's riparian rights to a lake located wholly
within the reservation was also upheld.
Where a state is attempting to regulate the use of
lands within the boundaries of a reservation, the Court
first addresses whether existing legislation is such so
as to preempt the state from asserting any basis for
regulating tribal lands. In Whiteside, supra, in
addition to the individual's challenge to tribal
regulation, the county attempted to assert jurisdiction
over the non-member fee lands inside the reservation.
The Court noted the numerous federal statutes which,
while not preempting the particular activity the county
was attempting to engage in, "embody and advance a
broad federal policy of recognizing Indian sovereignty
and encouraging tribal self-government. (It did not list
the numerous federal environmental statutes).
Finding no preemption merely by virtue of creation
of the reservation, the Court applied an interests
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analysis and held that the tribe did have authority to
regulate certain fee land owned by non-indians in one
area of the reservation, based on the second situation
in Montana. This is an area zoned as a "closed" area by
the tribe, with severe land use restrictions. In
balancing the interests of the tribe with that of the
county, the Court found that the county might have
authority to regulate an open area and remanded the case
for further findings by the District Court concerning
whether off-reservation impacts justified the assertion
of county authority. The Ninth Circuit relied on New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) for
the requirement of off-reservation impacts to support
county regulation. Thus, another layer of complexity is
added to the jurisdictional inquiry. It should be noted
that the Court did not address the fact that this land
was not on the reservation as was the case in Montana.
6. Tribal Water Use Regulation: Prior to the decision
in Montana, the Ninth Circuit addressed the authority
of tribes to regulate water use by non-members on lands
held in fee in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton,
647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1980) cert. denied 454 U.S.
1092.(1981). At issue was the tribe's right to regulate
use of a hydrological basin located wholly within the
reservation. The Court of Appeals found in favor of the
tribe for four reasons: (1) a water system in a unitary
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resource; (2) the need to avoid jurisdictional confusion;
(3) regulation of water on a reservation is critical to
the lifestyle of its residents and development of the
tribe's resources; and (4) unregulated use by Walton
would have had a direct impact on the tribe's downstream
uses which included a fishery. [647 F.2d at 51-52].
The Ninth Circuit has also addressed state attempts
to regulate non-member water uses after Montana. In
United States v. Anderson, 736 f.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
Applying a modified version of the Colville decision to
a very different factual situation led the Court to hold
that the state should have authority to regulate the use
of "surplus" waters by non-indians on fee lands within
the reservation. In Anderson, the subject waters were
those of Chamokane Creek, a tributary to the Columbia
River. The creek forms the eastern boundary of the
Spokane Indian Reservation, it is not wholly within the
reservation.
In Anderson, after Montana, the Court distinguished
Colville also on the basis of how non-members obtained
their interests in fee lands, distinguishing between the
allotments on the Spokane Reservation and on the Colville
Reservation lands were opened for entry and settlement,
suggesting an initial nonconsensual entry on to the
reservation. This distinction is also based on the fact
that when lands were opened for entry and settlement,
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r- under the federal homestead acts, non-indian homesteaders
had to obtain water rights under applicable state law.
Finally, the Court found there would be little impact on
tribal uses because a federal water master would be
appointed. Two more layers of complexity were added to
the jurisdictional inquiry.
Anderson represents a fundamental misconception of
Montana and two hundred years' worth of american
jurisprudence. The result is that reservation boundaries
are meaningless. Mere presence of non-members because
a reservation is open to entry and settlement does not
support the diminishment of reservation boundaries under
existing law. [See, Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463
(1984); also see Laurence, "Governmental Power In and
Around Indian Country", Paper No. 3 (Rocky Mtn Min. L.
Fdn. 1989)]. Montana is consistent with the diminishment
cases because it did not concern activities on land
recognized as part of the reservation. Just as any other
political boundary, be it national or state, a
reservation boundary has substantial meaning in and of
itself. One who crosses it is charged with full
knowledge that it has meaning. Just because a citizen of
New Mexico comes into Colorado, does not mean that

actions are to be governed by the laws of New Mexico.
Colorado cannot deny the New Mexico citizen her rights
under federal law because it is bound to the respect
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individual rights found in the Constitution. Tribes are
not bound by the same constraints.
D. FINAL COMMENTS

When all of these conflicting decisions are mixed
together, the result is a three dimensional labyrinth
that defies rational planning and resource use by any
one entity. First we separate the groundwater from the
land, and then we use different systems for allocating
authority over each resource, and then we go further and
separate water quality concerns from water quantity
concerns. Descartes would appreciate the theory.
In theory, the obvious answer is recognizing the
duty of governments to respect the rights of each other
and to cooperate for the mutual benefit for all their
inhabitants. The grim reality is that we are living in
the Malthusian nightmare; there is not enough to meet
all needs and competition is growing fierce over the most
vital of resources. Tribes are generally mistrustful of
federal action or settlements because they have lost so
much in the past. This is so similar to the allotment
process where tribes were denied lands that were not
"needed" so that non-members could have more. Tribes
were not allowed to define their need. Why should
states bother to negotiate if reservations can be
destroyed by migration of non-indians across reservation
borders? Also, federal action and negotiations are both
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expensive and time consuming, with no certainty of
success.
Numerous proposals have been made as to alternative
methods to resolve these disputes. Burton suggests a
federal water claims commission as a substitute to the
numerous adjudications now in progress. Williams
suggests international arbitration because he argues that
the federal government cannot act in the best interests
of the tribes. [Williams, "Emergence of a National Indian
Policy: Parens Patriae and Indian Tribal Sovereignty"
Paper No. 1 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. (1989)].
Both Burton and Collins seek to escape the
negotiation or litigation dilemma. The International
solution is very problematic. Even if an international
tribunal would hear a tribal claim, international law is
not an escape from the principles of U.S. law, nor does
it guarantee a neutral decisionmaker. Rather, it would
make tribes into pawns in international power plays where
the influence of the United States cannot be
underestimated. The United States has refused to
recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in the past, why would it recognize any other
international tribunal. Finally, the tribe must maintain
its unique relationship with the federal government after
any such arbitration. Burton's suggestion sounds quite
reasonable, but it has the handicap of requiring Congress
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to pay-off some entity. This is never popular with the
constituency back home. From a tribal standpoint, there
is the legacy of the Indian Claims Commission which must
be overcome: Tribes get some money, others get water.
Both of these hurdles are awesome. This alternative may
be the best solution, but it is not available now.
Despite the major obstacles present in negotiating
cooperative agreements, tribes and the communities around
them are pursuing this option. These mechanisms do allow
the tribe to control the trade-offs that it will have to
make. The cooperative effort of the Colville Reservation
and the State of Washington is but one example. The Fort
Peck Agreement with the State of Montana and the
Agreement reached between the Utes and the State of
Colorado are others. The progress of these relationships
will be monitored by many tribes. If successful, more
may consider this as an alternative to the courtroom.
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